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Abstract 
The U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was built into the 1985 
U.S. Food Security Act with a major objective being to increase sales of 
U.S. agricultural commodities. Through the EEP, the U.S. government 
subsidizes exports of agricultural commodities to targeted countries. The 
EEP was applied to the majority of U.S. wheat sales in 1987/88 and 
1988/89. Coincident with the 1985 act and EEP legislation, U.S. wheat 
exports have increased significantly. 
This study uses a nonspatial, partial equilibrium model of world 
wheat trade to analyze the impact of the EEP on U.S. wheat exports and 
share of world wheat trade. The study indicates that the effect of the 
EEP on the wheat market over the period 1986/87 to 1988/89 has been a 
large displacement of commercial wheat sales (87-92%), with export 
additionality due to the EEP being only 8-13%. The impact of the EEP on 
other exporters' wheat trade and importer demand has been small relative 
to the magnitude of total EEP sales. 
Introduction 
U.S. wheat exports declined significantly from a peak level of 48.2 
million metric tons (mmt) in crop year 1981/82 to 25.2 mmt in 1985/86. In 
addition, the value of export index for U.S. wheat declined by 45 percent 
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over the same period. The reasons for this dramatic decline were 
generally attributed to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, debt problems 
of developing countries, slow income growth in many importing countries, 
legislated loan rate levels for wheat in the United States that caused a 
significant increase in U.S. government stocks and provided a high price 
floor for other exporters, and unfair export subsidization by competing 
wheat exporters (U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). 
The dramatic reversal of export value and volume after a decade of 
steady growth was a significant factor in the design of the Food Security 
Act of 1985. This act, covering crop years 1986/87 to 1990/91, included, 
inter alia, significant reductions in U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation 
loan rates, high target prices to support U.S. farm income, acreage 
reduction programs to control domestic production, and the Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP) to provide export subsidies to certain importing 
countries to increase exports and remove excess commodity stocks. 
Since the implementation of the 1985 act, U.S. wheat exports have 
increased significantly, to 43.3 mmt in 1987/88. This increase is 
attributed to many factors, including low yields due to drought in major 
wheat exporting countries; large increases in import demand by the Soviet 
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Union, the People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe; depreciation of 
the U.S. dollar; the lower wheat loan rate legislated in the 1985 act; and 
increased wheat purchases by some importers whose imports are subsidized 
through the EEP (Bailey 1989). From the trade and domestic policies 
perspectives, it is important to isolate the effect of the EEP from other 
factors that have influenced U.S. wheat exports and the world wheat 
market. 
The specific objectives of this study are (1) to analyze the impact 
of the EEP on U.S. wheat exports, trade share, and world price; (2) to 
evaluate the effect of the EEP on the displacement of U.S. commercial 
sales; and (3) to analyze the effect of the EEP on competing exporters' 
exports and trade shares. 
The organization of this study is as follows. In the next section, a 
brief description of the Export Enhancement Program is given. In the 
third section, the structure and components of the world wheat trade model 
used in this study are explained. A detailed discussion of the 
theoretical analysis of incorporating the EEP into the world wheat trade 
model is also provided in this section. In the next section, empirical 
issues in incorporating the EEP into the model are discussed. In the 
fifth section, the impacts of the EEP on the U.S. and the world wheat 
markets are presented. The final section describes conclusions and 
limitations of this study. 
The Export Enhancement Program 
The EEP program was announced in May 1985 and later included in the 
1985 act. As stated by the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA, the 
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criteria for evaluating sales under the EEP were 
1. Additionality: Sales must increase U.S. agricultural exports 
above what would have occurred in the absence of the program. 
2. Targeting: Sales will be targeted to specific market 
opportunities, especially those that challenge competitors who subsidize 
exports. 
3. Cost Effectiveness: Sales should result in a net gain to the 
overall economy. 
4. Budget Neutrality: Sales should not increase the budget outlays 
beyond what would have occurred in the absence of a program. 
The objectives of the EEP, as specified in the 1985 act, are (1) to 
make U.S. exports more competitive in the world market and (2) to offset 
the adverse effects on U.S. exports due to unfair trade practices or 
subsidies by exporters, U.S. price supports that are above competitors' 
prices, and fluctuation in exchange rates. This program mandated the 
United States Department of Agriculture to utilize a minimum of $1 billion 
to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports. Under this program about $2.9 
billion has been allocated to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports through 
fiscal year (FY) 1990 (as of June 1989). Under the provisions of this 
program, export subsidies (bonuses) are offered to exporting firms that 
sell commodities to the targeted countries. Hence, the United States is 
able to increase exports by directly competing with the export subsidies 
offered by the European Economic Community, concentrating on the markets 
currently held by the EEC. 
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The EEP has played a large role in the U.S. wheat export program, 
being applied to 70 percent of U.S. wheat exports in 1987/88 and a 
projected 60 percent in 1988/89 (USDA World Grain Situation and Outlook, 
February 1989). By June 1989, a total of 61.0 mmt of U.S. wheat had been 
sold under the Export Enhancement Program, at an estimated average subsidy 
of $29 per ton. The EEP has been used to subsidize wheat sales in 26 
importing countries, with major importers including the USSR (17.4 mmt), 
China (12.3 mmt), Egypt (6.1 mmtl, Algeria (5.2 mmt), Morocco (4.2 mmt), 
India (2.0 mmtl, Poland (2.0 mmt), Iraq (2.0 mmt), the Philippines (1.8 
mmt), and Tunisia (1.1 mmt). 
Recent studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1987) and 
Bailey (1988) have analyzed the net impact of the EEP in terms of 
additionality and cost effectiveness. Bailey, in particular, found that 
the net result of EEP in 1987/88 was displacement of commercial sales (90 
percent), with only 10 percent additionality. Oleson (1987) concluded 
that U.S. wheat exports have not responded such that the EEP is 
justifiable from an export value basis. Although the increase in U.S. 
exports is only one objective of the EEP, the analysis of effectiveness of 
the EEP in this regard is necessary in understanding the recent world 
wheat trade markets. 
The Methodology 
In this section, the structure and components of the world wheat 
trade model are explained, and a theoretical analysis of EEP is 
presented. 
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The Structure and Components of the World Wheat Trade Hodel 
The wheat trade model is a nonspatial, partial equilibrium model of 
trade. As such, it does not model trade flows between specific regions or 
cross-commodity impacts on the wheat sector. The model dynamically 
determines trade equilibrium through price adjustments to clear excess 
supply and demands. The model contains 19 country/regional submodels and 
market clearing conditions. Wheat exporters modeled include the United 
States, Canada, the EEC, Australia, and Argentina. Major importers 
modeled include the USSR, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, 
Algeria, Brazil, Eastern Europe, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, other 
Africa and Middle East, other Asia, and other Latin America. The model 
thus includes detailed specification of the major markets affected by the 
EEP. 
The basic elements of a nonspatial, partial equilibrium supply and 
demand model are illustrated in Figure 1. The U.S. export supply curve 
(ESUS) is the difference between domestic supply (SUS) and demand (DUS) in 
the United States, which represents the quantity supplied in the world 
market at various price levels. Other exporters' supply and demand 
schedules are given in the lower panel. The curve ESO is the combined 
excess supply of all competing exporters, which is derived as the 
difference between the supply and the demand of all competing exporters. 
The import demand schedule (EDT) of all importers is their total demand 
minus total supply. Other competitors' export supply and importers' 
import demand are represented in the top panel, third diagram from the 
left. The export demand schedule (EDN) facing the United States is the 
IMPORTERS 
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Figure 1. Determination of equilibrium prices and quantities in the wheat trade model 
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difference between the import demand of all importers and the export 
supply of competitors. The kinked, less elastic nature of the EDN results 
from the restricted trade policies pursued by some foreign countries, 
which insulate domestic prices from world price variability (see below for 
details). A trade equilibrium is allowed by the clearing of excess 
demands and supplies generated within each region. The model defines the 
degree of price transmission of world market conditions into each regional 
submodel through a price linkage equation. The algebraic forms of the 
necessary components of the model are given below. 
m 
EDT= l:CFOD. (PD., x1.l +FED. (PD., x2.l + sD. (PD., x3.l . ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ 
~ 
- SU.(PS., X4 .)J ~ ~ ~ ( 1) 
i 1, ... , m importers; 
n 
ESO ~(SUj(PSj, X4j) - [FODj(PDj, x 1j) + FEDj(PDj' x2j) 
+ SD . ( PD . , x3 . ) ]) J J J (2) 
j = 1, •.• , n other exporters; 
ESUS = SU (P , x4u) - [FOD (P , X1 ) + FED (P , x2 ) u u u u u u u u 
+ SD (P , x3 ) ] u u u (3) 
u.s. excess supply; 
ESUS = EDN EDT - ESO world market equilibrium; (4) 
PD. = Gi(Pu • ei, Zi) i 1, ••. , m importers; and (5) ~ 
PD. = G. (P • ej' Zj) j = 1, . .. , n exporters, (6) J J u 
where 
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FOD domestic food demand; 
FED domestic feed demand; 
SD = domestic stock demand; 
su = domestic supply; 
EDT = excess demand function of all importers; 
ESO excess supply function of all exporters, excluding the United 
States; 
ESUS = excess supply function of the United States; 
EDN = excess demand facing the United States; 
PD = domestic market price; 
PS = domestic supply price; 
P U.S. Gulf port price; 
u 
e exchange rate; 
Z vector of policy variables (tariffs, subsidies) that influence 
the price transmission; 
Xk =vector of demand shifters (k = 1, ... , 3); and 
x4 = vector of supply shifters. 
Supply is determined as yield times acreage harvested, which is 
endogenously estimated. One of the salient features of the model is the 
inclusion of government programs in estimating the acreage functions. 
Particularly in the United States, program participation rates are 
endogenously estimated as a function of expected wheat net returns. Area 
planted under programs is determined from participation rate, base acres, 
and acreage reduction rate. Nonprogram planted acreage is endogenously 
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estimated. Total planted area is the sum of program and nonprogram 
planted area. The theoretical specification of food use is based on the 
consumer theory of utility maximization subject to budget constraint. The 
variables that enter the demand functions are own price (wheat price), 
prices of competing goods, and income. Because feed is used as input in 
livestock production, the theoretical specification of feed demand is 
estimated as a function of own price, prices of competing feed products, 
and livestock product prices. Stock demand is endogenized in the model by 
using speculative and transactions motives of inventory demand theory. 
Current price, expected production, and government stocks are used to 
capture the speculative motive. Current production is used to explain the 
transaction motive. 
Equilibrium prices, quantities, and net trade are determined by 
equating excess demands and supplies across regions (Eq. 4) and explicitly 
linking domestic market prices in each region to the world price (Eqs. 5 
and 6). Except where they are set by governments, domestic prices are 
linked to world prices via price linkage equations including bilateral 
exchange rates and transfer service margins. Inclusion of price linkage 
equations in the model allows one to endogenize the stabilizing and 
insulating behavior of government policies. Where some degree of 
insulation of domestic prices from external market conditions exists, the 
free adjustment of trade flows is restricted by limiting the quantity 
traded at the given level of domestic prices. The price linkage equation 
defines the degree of price transmission of external market conditions 
into the internal system. 
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Trade occurs whether price transmission is allowed or not. The quantity 
traded adjusts only to internal conditions if there is no price 
transmission. 
The model is estimated over the sample period 1965-1986 using annual 
data. The supply, use, and price data for the U.S. component of the model 
came from various issues of USDA Agricultural Statistics. Policy 
variables such as target prices and loan rates were collected from the 
fact sheets of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS). 
Supply and use data for foreign countries come from the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prices 
are from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations, Canadian Grain Trade Statistics, and EC Grains, Oilseeds, and 
Livestock: Selected Statistics. Macroeconomic data for all countries are 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
The functional form of the model is linear in parameters. All supply 
and demand equations are estimated in quantity-dependent form in real 
prices and incomes. The estimation procedure used is ordinary least 
squares. The OLS estimation technique is preferred over simultaneous 
estimation techniques such as two-stage least squares and three-stage 
least squares because, with a large number of exogenous variables and a 
limited number of observations, simultaneous estimation techniques pose 
degrees-of-freedom problems. Furthermore, in many countries, prices are 
set by government policies. Prices are determined by supply and demand in 
only a few countries. As a result, any potential gain that could be 
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achieved by simultaneous estimation is offset by the potential loss if 
there is any misspecification in the model. The presence of serial 
correlation in the error structure is corrected using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure. 
In general, the statistical fit of the model is good, and the 
estimated coefficients in the behavioral equations conform to the a priori 
' expectations. The estimated supply, demand, and price transmission 
elasticities are given in appendix tables A.1 and A.2, which represent 
behavioral relationships in the model. The empirical model adequately 
reflects the structure of the world wheat market. Furthermore, since the 
model is frequently used for forecasting and policy analysis, a rigorous 
validation test was conducted to test the overall ability of the model to 
replicate the observed values of the endogenous variables. In the 
validation run, the structural form of the model was dynamically simulated 
over the study period. Simulation statistics used to measure the model's 
fitting performance include root mean square error, root mean square 
percent error, and Theil statistics. The simulation statistics indicate 
that the model performs satisfactorily. 
Incorporation of the EEP in the World Wheat Trade Hodel 
The EEP is an export subsidy program targeted to specific importers 
where each importer may receive a different subsidy level. The economics 
of an optimal targeted subsidy program have been outlined by Paarlberg 
(1984), and by Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharples (1987). While noting that 
a general export subsidy program is always welfare-reducing for a large 
12 
country, a targeted subsidy program may lead to welfare increases. The 
exporter price discrimination strategy is to offer lower selling prices in 
markets with relatively price elastic demand, thus, taxing relatively 
inelastic markets, the net result is an export revenue increase. 
The existence of an export subsidy in any market affects the ability 
of other competitive exporters to make sales at the "market clearing 
price." In highly competitive markets, the other exporters will have to 
fully match the EEP subsidy or forego their market share. Thus, other 
exporters' net prices are directly affected by the EEP subsidies. A 
unique feature of the EEP is that the export subsidies are paid in generic 
payment-in-kind (PIK) certificates, which are generally redeemed for 
J 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks, but can also be sold for cash. 
The issuance of PIK certificates under this program results in an increase 
in market availability of U.S. supplies of wheat. The incorporation of 
the effect of the PIK certificates in the analysis of the EEP was 
developed by Bailey (1988). This study adopts Bailey's approach but 
treats the response of other exporters differently. 
Thus, three important features of the EEP that must be explicitly 
modeled are (1) the subsidy offered to each targeted import market, (2) 
the net price effect on competitive exporters' excess supply functions, 
and (3) the supply effect of PIK certificates issued as EEP Payments. 
The effect of the EEP on the world market is illustrated in Figure 
2. First consider the effect of targeted subsidy to the importers. The 
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price transmission equations of importers, which receive the targeted 
export subsidies, become 
= G. [ (P - S<) 
~ u ~ 
(7) 
where Si = EEP subsidy to importer i. This will result in a movement 
along the importer's excess demand curve by the amount of the subsidy. At 
every price level, the importers' effective excess demand curve will lie 
above their excess demand curve by the amount of the subsidy. In Figure 2 
this is represented by an upward shift in a targeted importers' excess 
demand curves by the amount of the subsidy S .. 
~ 
Second, consider the effect of the EEP on competitors' wheat markets. 
This effect is modeled through the price linkage equation as 
PD . = G. [ ( P - S . ) • e . , Z .], 
J J u J J J 
(8) 
where Sj is the average effective subsidy (i.e., price reduction) offered 
by the jth exporter on export sales to be competitive with EEP. This will 
result in a movement along the exporter's excess supply curve by the 
amount of the effective subsidy. At every price level, the exporter's 
effective excess supply curve will lie above their excess supply curve by 
the amount of the effective subsidy. In Figure 2, the impact on the EEC 
is merely an increase in the amount of export restitutions, while the 
impact of this effective subsidy on other exporters is represented by an 
upward shift in the competitors' total export supply curve of other 
• exporters from ES2 to ES2'. Thus, the excess supply curve of all other 
exporters shifts from ESO to ESO'. The specific conjectural variation 
u.s. 
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in this analysis is that competitive exporters respond to U.S. EEP 
• subsidies with their own matching subsidies or price reductions. 
Previous studies have used the conjectural variation of no response by 
other exporters (Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharples 1987) or price response 
by only selected other exporters. Haley (1988) analyzed the impact of the 
EEP with the assumption of competitive price responses by the European 
Community only. Bailey (1988, 1989) analyzed the EEP using the conjecture 
that the EEC and Argentina responded, while Canada and Australia did not 
respond to the EEP with export price reductions. The approach of 
competitive price response by all other exporters will capture the world 
wheat market more accurately as evidenced by the competitors' actual price 
responses to the EEP. 
Finally, consider the supply effect of the generic PIK certificates 
issued through the EEP. Use of the generic PIK certificates to redeem the 
CCC-owned wheat stocks will increase market supply of U.S. wheat. 
However, generic PIK certificates issued on EEP wheat sales can be used to 
redeem any available commodity in the CCC-owned stocks. As a result, only 
a portion of the certificates are used to redeem wheat stocks. For 
example, according to the USDA, in the 1987/88 crop year only 21 percent 
of total PIK certificates were used for wheat redemption. This extra 
wheat supply results in a rightward shift of the U.S supply curve from SUS 
to SUS' in Figure 2 and the U.S. excess supply curve from ESUS to ESUS'. 
This supply effect is captured by the equation 
m 
i.'.Q = [ Cl: S. o ED. ) o 6) I P 
u i=O ~ ~e r 
0,;6,;1, (9) 
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where n~ = change in market availability of U.S. wheat supplies, 
ED. =net imports by ith importer using EEP, 
1e 
S. = subsidy on imports by ith importer, 
1 
P = PIK certificate redemption price for wheat in US$ per 
r 
bushel, and 
6 = proportion of PIK certificates used to redeem CCC wheat 
stocks. 
Thus, the total EEP-issued PIK certificates used to redeem wheat stocks 
m 
[{L) 
i=O 
S. • ED. ) • 6] divided by the average redemption price defines the 
1 1e 
increase in U.S. marketable wheat stocks. 
Thus, the EEP results in an upward shift in the net export demand 
facing the United States, which is caused by the increased import demand 
by the importers and reduced export supply of the competitors. This, 
combined with an outward shift in the U.S. excess supply schedule, will 
result in an unambiguous increase in U.S. wheat exports. The effect of 
the EEP on the market clearing price is ambiguous because of the 
offsetting excess demand-supply effects. In Figure 2, these offsetting 
excess supply and demand effects are shown as resulting in no change in 
the U.S. market clearing price, but either a price increase or decrease 
could alternatively have been illustrated. The overall impact of the EEP 
depends on the size of EEP subsidies, the price responsiveness of import 
demand, the price transmission elasticities of both import and export 
markets, the effective average subsidies offered by other exporters, the 
17 
the elasticity of supply of export competitors, and redemptions of U.S. 
CCC wheat stocks due to EEP-issued PIK certificates. 
Empirical Incorporation of the EEP into the World Wheat Trade Model 
The major empirical incorporations of the EEP into the world wheat 
trade model are the determination of (1) the appropriate average import 
subsidy S. received by each targeted importer, (2) the appropriate 
~ 
average export subsidy S. offered by each competitive exporter, and (3) 
J 
additional U.S. wheat supply resulting from EEP-issued PIK certificates. 
This section discribes the empirical issues related to these three 
categories. 
Subsidies to Importers 
From the data collected on EEP sales announcements by the USDA, 
estimates were obtained for the subsidy on each sale and total EEP 
shipments by crop year to each targeted importer. The average EEP 
subsidy offered by the United States to a targeted importer in a crop 
year is computed as total subsidy divided by total shipments to that 
importer. The average export subsidies received by the importing 
countries are given in Table 1. 
The average export subsidies (bonuses) paid by the United States 
were then assumed to be matched by all other exporters for their 
commercial sales (non-aid sales) into the specific market. For example, 
the USSR received an average export subsidy of $35.40/mt in 1987/88 for 
the U.S. EEP wheat exports, and it is assumed that other exporting 
countries also offered the same amount of subsidy to the USSR in 
18 
Table 1. Subsidies received by the importers for U.S. wheat EEP 
shipments 
Country 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89a 
USSR 
EEP Shipments (1000mtl 
EEP as Percent of Tota~ Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
China 
Egypt 
EEP Shipments (lOOOmt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
EEP Shipments (1000mt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Importsc 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
Algeria 
EEP Shipments (1000mt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
Morocco 
EEP Shipments (lOOOmt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
India 
Iraq 
EEP Shipments (1000mt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
EEP Shipments (1000mt) 
EEP~ as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
Tunisia 
EEP Shipments (lOOOmt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
Philippines 
EEP Shipments (lOOOmt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
Poland 
EEP Shipments (lOOOmt) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US$/mt) 
115 
1 
35.75 
1,540 
25 
32.40 
1,194 
35 
36.89 
895 
60 
42.60 
330 
12 
23.33 
562 
50 
23.32 
475 
N/A 
41.31 
12,304 
57 
35.40 
4,325 
29 
39.85 
1,979 
29 
33.82 
2,015 
53 
37.91 
1,680 
88 
37.67 
150 
36 
24.72 
892 
33 
27.77 
450 
52 
38.02 
437 
40 
27.77 
1,500 
N/A 
39.74 
Note: Calculated on a June-May shipment basis. 
a To June 1989. 
b Estimated by contract announcement data and trade information. 
c This total import figure includes aid shipments. 
N/A = not available. 
4,800 
32 
22.02 
7,550 
47 
22.48 
2,046 
32 
19.26 
1,205 
28 
20.59 
760 
51 
20.55 
1,850 
92 
21.00 
715 
28 
14.68 
50 
0.5 
24.52 
1,143 
100 
12.97 
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1987/88. Thus, the importer is assumed to receive the average subsidy on 
its entire commercial imports, excluding aid shipments. This is an 
extreme assumption in that the specific importer-exporter relationship 
with regard to long-term agreements, credit availability, and wheat 
quality consideration will affect the degree to which any exporter must 
compete with the effective U.S. price in the market. Also, subsidies are 
limited in most markets to the total EEP sales that will be completed, and 
this moderates the need of other exporters to be EEP competitive. This 
assumption will thus overestimate the impact of the EEP on U.S. wheat 
' exports and total world trade in this nonspatial model. This assumption 
was also used by Bailey (1988) in examining the impact of the EEP. 
The incorporation of the EEP into importer submodels does not capture 
the impact of downward price pressure in markets not targeted for EEP 
sales, even though exporters displaced in EEP markets may price more 
competitively in the remaining non-EEP markets. 
Effective Export Subsidies 
The effective export subsidies (i.e., average price reductions) 
offered by U.S. export competitors were calculated by assuming the 
exporters generally responded to be competitive with the U.S. EEP subsidy. 
The average effective export subsidy is equal to the country's proportion 
of total commercial sales to targeted EEP markets weighted by the 
respective average EEP subsidies to each market. The results of this 
calculation are given in Table 2. For example, the average Canadian 
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Table 2. Effective export subsidies offered by exporters 
Exporters 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
US$/mt 
Canada 6.00 18.00 7.00 
Australia 12.00 15.00 7.00 
EEC 8.00 15.00 13.00 
Argentina 7.50 16.00 9.00 
Note: These export subsidies are estimated average export revenue 
declines due to the U.S. Export Enhancement Program. For instance, the 
$7.50/mmt effective bonus offered by Argentina for its wheat exports in 
1986/87 is the additional average discount for Argentine wheat below 
U.S. FOB Gulf port price due to EEP competition. 
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effective export subsidy, which is the decline in the average export 
revenue due to the EEP, is estimated to be US$18/mt in 1987/88. This is 
7 
because approximately 32 percent of Canadian exports go to China, which 
received an average EEP subsidy of US$39.85/mt, and 18 percent go to the 
USSR, which received an average EEP subsidy of US$35.40/mt. Other 
significant Canadian wheat export markets targeted by the EEP in 1987/88 
were Algeria (3%), Brazil (3%), and Iraq (3%). Record Canadian wheat 
exports of 23.5 mmt in 1987/88 indicate that Canada was price competitive 
in 1987/88 and, in fact, Canadian ending stocks of wheat relative to 
1986/87 were reduced by approximately 5.0 mmt. 
The 1988/89 calculated average net price reduction for Canada of 
$7.00/mt is a reflection of significantly drought-reduced production in 
1988. Estimates of Canadian exports of only 11.8 mmt for 1988/89 (50 
percent of the 1987/88 level), and a very high average quality harvest, 
indicate that Canada need not have had to compete directly with EEP price 
levels. This was directly reflected in increases in the 1988/89 Canadian 
initial price to producers from C$120/mt (prior to harvest) to C$170/mt. 
The incorporation of the EEP into exporter submodels does not account 
for downward price pressure in markets not targeted for EEP sales, even 
though exporters displaced in EEP markets may have priced more 
competitively in the remaining non-EEP markets. 
Incorporation of EEP Issued PIK Certificates 
The EEP subsidy payment to U.S. exporters in generic certificates 
increases the market access to CCC-held commodity stocks. The generic 
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certificates are fungible in the sense that they can be redeemed for any 
available CCC-held stocks or traded freely for cash. In this sense, it 
does not seem unreasonable to assume that EEP-issued PIK certificates 
would enter into the pool of generic certificates issued under other 
government programs and be redeemed for commodities at the historical 
rate. The 1986-1988 generic certificates supply and use are outlined in 
Table 3. In 1986/87, only $205 million of a total $8.1 billion 
certificates were issued through the EEP for wheat. PIK certificate 
redemptions for wheat in 1986/87 represented only 18.2 percent of the 
total. The certificates are assumed to be redeemed at the crop-year 
average rate, taking into account any PIK certificate premiums over face 
value. 
The pattern of wheat certificate exchange has a direct impact on the 
U.S. wheat submodel and must be carefully analyzed. Table 4 shows the 
pattern of PIK certificate redemptions for 1986/87 and 1987/88. The CCC 
wheat auction was a dominant market force in 1987/88, accounting for 46 
percent of wheat redemptions. This changed the pattern of wheat 
redemptions between nine-month loans, Farmer-Owned-Reserve (FOR) stock, 
and CCC stock from 1986/87 to 1987/88 as the CCC wheat auction released 
only CCC stocks. 
The impact of wheat EEP-issued PIK certificates on U.S. marketable 
stocks of wheat is calculated by using Equation 9. The total wheat 
EEP-issued PIK certificates is estimated using EEP contract announcement 
data and market information on subsidy level per sale. The proportion of 
these generic PIK certificates that are actually redeemed for wheat 
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Table 3. Generic certificate supply and use 
1986/87 1987/88 
(Million US$) 
Carry-in 0 2,050 
Certificates Issued 8' 138 11,937 
Wheat EEP Issued 205 1,026 
Certificate Redemptions 6,088 10,020 
Wheat 1,106 2,124 
Wheat as Percent of Total Redemptions 18.2 21.2 
SOURCE: Bailey and Houck 1989. 
Table 4. u.s. generic certificate exchange for wheat 
1986/87 1987/88 
Wheat Certificate Exchange (mil. $) 1,106 2,124 
Wheat Redemptions (mil. bu) 457 834 
9-month loans 221 190 
FOR loans 84 64 
CCC Stocks 152 580 
CCC Wheat Auction Activity (mil. bu)a 0 385.2 
Bailey and Houck 1989. SOURCE: 
astocks 
1989). 
released through CCC wheat auctions were CCC stocks (USDA 
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stocks is assumed to be the historical rate for total PIK redemptions; 
i.e., 18.2 percent in 1986/87, 21.2 percent in 1987/88, and 8 percent in 
1988/89. The average redemption price for wheat was estimated by using 
the crop year average wheat price (on-farm) times the average cash 
premium of PIK certificates to their face value. 
Results 
The major aspects of the EEP were incorporated into the model, and a 
baseline simulation was developed for years 1985/86 to 1988/89. The 
impact of the EEP for crop years 1986/87 to 1988/89 was then determined 
by running the alternate (no-EEP) scenario in which (1) the EEP effects 
on importers and exporters were removed (i.e., all S. and S. were set to 
~ J 
zero) and (2) U.S. market supply reductions resulting from fewer PIK 
certificates were incorporated. The analytical results from the baseline 
and no-EEP scenario are summarized in Tables 5-7. The impact of the EEP, 
measured as the difference between the two scenarios, is given in 
Table 8. 
The results indicate that U.S. wheat exports increased by 31 million 
bushels in 1986/87 because of the EEP (Table 5) , while actual EEP 
shipments were estimated to be 245 million bushels. Thus, the 
additionality (i.e., increase in U.S. exports above what would have 
occurred in the absence of the program) was 13 percent (31 million 
bushels) and commercial displacement was 87 percent (214 million bushels). 
The estimated cost of the EEP shipment subsidies for 1986/87 was $224 
million (estimated by EEP contract announcement data and trade reported 
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Table 5. u.s. wheat supply and use under baseline and no-EEP scenario 
Variables Scenarios 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Planted Area Base 75.6 72.1 65.8 65.5 
(million acres) No-EEP 75.6 72.1 65.7 64.6 
Production Base 2,425 2,092 2,107 1,814 
(million bushels) No-EEP 2,425 2,092 2,102 1,787 
Total Supply Base 3,866 4,018 3,945 3,097 
(million bushels) No-EEP 3,866 4,018 3,969 3,168 
Domestic Use Base 1,046 1,193 1,094 1,057 
(million bushels) No-EEP 1,046 1,196 1,102 1,060 
Ending Stocks Base 1,905 1,821 1,261 538 
(million bushels) No-EEP 1,905 1,850 1,360 690 
Exports Base 915 1,004 1,592 1,501 
(million bushels) No-EEP 915 973 1,509 1,417 
Farm Price Base 3.08 2.42 2.57 3.68 
(US$/bu) No-EEP 3.08 2.37 2.39 3.62 
u.s. Export Market Base 32.7 32.6 45.5 46.9 
Share (percent) No-EEP 32.7 31.8 43.8 45.2 
u.s. Gulf Port 
Price Base 130.00 109.00 124.00 164.73 
._: .. (US$mt) No-EEP 130.00 106.98 117.24 162.34 
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Table 6. Competitors' wheat supply and exports 
Countries Scenarios 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Canada 
Area Harvested Base 14.22 13.53 12.91 
(million ha) No-EEP 14.22 13.61 13.17 
Production Base 31.34 26.01 15.70 
(mmt) No-EEP 31.34 26.16 16.01 
Exports Base 20.98 23.54 11.80 
(mmt) No-EEP 21.11 23.93 12.04 
Australia 
Area Harvested Base 11.10 9.10 9.00 
(million hal No-EEP 11.10 9.20 9.17 
Production Base 16.10 12.41 13 .80 
(mmt) No-EEP 16.10 12.54 14.06 
Exports Base 15.60 9.60 11.50 
(mmt) No-EEP 15.60 9.98 11.68 
EEC 
Area Harvested Base 15.70 15.90 15.40 
(million ha) No-EEP 15.70 15.90 15.40 
Production Base 71.97 71.60 75.70 
(mmt) No-EEP 71.97 71.60 75.70 
Exports Base 14.48 14.29 19.00 
(mmt) No-EEP 14.48 14.29 19.00 
Argentina 
Area Harvested Base 5.00 4.80 4.50 
(million ha) No-EEP 5.00 4.85 4.61 
Production Base 8.90 9.00 7.40 
(mmt) No-EEP 8.90 9.10 7.57 
Exports Base 4.40 3.70 3.20 
(mmt) No-EEP 4.42 3.81 3.38 
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Table 7. Wheat net imports 
Countries Scenarios 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
(mmt) 
USSR Base 15.50 21.00 12.00 
No-EEP 15.54 20.38 11.55 
China Base 8.51 15.00 15.01 
No-EEP 8.51 15.00 15.01 
Japan Base 5.80 5.70 5. 40 
No-EEP 5.80 5.70 5.40 
Eastern Europe Base 1.99 1. 41 -1.50 
No-EEP 1.99 1.41 -1.50 
Egypt Base 6.02 6.43 6.40 
No-EEP 6.02 6.43 6.40 
Algeria Base 3.41 3.80 3.70 
No-EEP 3.31 3.70 3.62 
India Base -0.32 -0.45 2.45 
No-EEP -0.32 -0.75 1.87 
Brazil Base 2.70 2.05 2.44 
No-EEP 2.70 2.03 2.43 
Mexico Base 0.46 0.75 1.20 
No-EEP 0.46 0.75 1.20 
Tunisia Base 1.13 0.85 1.10 
No-EEP 1.11 0.82 1.08 
Morocco Base 1. 50 1.90 1. 52 
No-EEP 1.38 1. 72 1.38 
Other Africa and Base 14.44 13.45 12.96 
Middle East No-EEP 14.44 13.44 12.86 
Other Latin Base 5.53 5. 43 5.65 
America No-EEP 5.54 5.49 5. 72 
Other Asia Base 8.23 9.17 9.65 
No-EEP 7.68 8.64 9.21 
Total Net Trade Base 82.22 94.29 85.74 
No-EEP 81.51 92.60 84.08 
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Table 8. Impact of the export enhancement program on U.S. wheat exports 
U.S. Wheat Exports Base 
No-EEP 
Change due to EEP 
Actual EEP Shipmentsb 
Commercial Displacement (percent) 
Additionality (percent) 
Estimated EEP Subsidiesb 
(million US$) 
1986/87 
1,004 
973 
31 
245 
87 
13 
224 
1987/88 1988/89a 
(million bushels) 
1,592 
1,509 
83 
1,016 
92 
8 
997 
1,501 
1,417 
84 
839 
90 
10 
474 
~EEP shipments as of June 1989. 
Estimated using shipment data by contract announcement. 
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prices). This figure, the gross subsidy outlay, does not account for 
changes in carrying costs caused by reduced wheat stocks or for changes in 
CCC program costs caused by changes in the U.S. farm price for wheat. 
Although the size of the EEP varied over the three-year period, the 
estimated percentage of additionality remained relatively constant at 8-13 
percent. In 1987/88 with 1,016 million bushels of EEP shipments, only 83 
million bushels were estimated as additionality. 
The EEP has had a noticeable impact on U.S. ending stocks, export 
levels and export market shares, U.S. farm price, and world price (U.S. 
Gulf port price) for wheat. In all years, 1986/87 to 1988/89, the price 
impact of the EEP-induced increased demand for U.S. exports has outweighed 
the U.S. domestic supply effect (caused by increased PIK certificates), 
resulting in a higher U.S. wheat price. This supports the view that the 
EEP tended to exaggerate the impact of the 1988 drought-reduced wheat 
supply in the United States. The world wheat price increased by 
US$6.76/mt in 1987/88 and US$2.39/mt in 1988/89 due to the EEP. 
The response of other exporters to the EEP is summarized in Table 6. 
The results indicate only a minor negative impact of the EEP on exports 
from Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Wheat production levels 
• in these countries also showed a minor negative impact of the EEP. The 
European Community, with a price transmission elasticity of zero based on 
its variable import levy system of price supports, does not respond to the 
EEP in terms of total export volume. The EEC export of wheat was 
moderately displaced in certain Middle East markets, but increased exports 
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to the USSR and other countries have resulted in no significant reductions 
in EEC total exports. The analysis assumes domestic wheat programs of 
other exporters and importers as exogenous, and thus, any impact that the 
EEP may have had on EEC policy changes over this period is not captured in 
the analysis. 
The impacts of the EEP on major wheat importers are given in Table 7. 
The impact of the EEP on importers depends upon the domestic price 
transmission elasticity with respect to the import price facing the 
country. For the People's Republic of China, the model assumes that the 
domestic price and domestic use are exogenous to the import price and, 
thus, that the EEP has no impact on China's wheat imports. Given a 
reported increase in total domestic wheat use in China over the period, 
9 
the results for China may underestimate the impact of the EEP. 
Egypt, one of the largest EEP recipients, also exhibits no net import 
response to the EEP. This is a reasonable result given that actual 
Egyptian wheat imports have remained fairly constant since the 
introduction of the EEP. The composition of Egyptian imports by country 
of origin, however, has changed in favor of the United States since the 
introduction of the EEP. 
The USSR total net import response to the EEP is also moderate 
because domestic demand and supply are only partially responsive to import 
prices. Again, the composition of USSR net imports may have been altered 
significantly by the EEP, but these net trade flows are not captured by 
the nonspatial equlibrium model. 
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The overall net wheat trade increased 0.7 mmt in 1986/87, 1.7 mmt in 
1987/88, and 1.7 mmt in 1988/89 in response to the EEP. 
Limitations and Conclusions 
The result must be viewed in the context of the limitations of an 
annual nonspatial equilibrium model. The model assumes that wheat is a 
single homogenous commodity by each exporter. As such, the model does not 
capture the effect of quality differences between exporters and does not 
analyze the differential impacts across classes of wheat within the United 
States. The impact of the EEP on U.S. durum wheat is different from that 
for the U.S. white wheat market. Because the model is a partial 
equilibrium model, the cross-commodity effects, which may be significant, 
are not incorporated in determining the net impact of the EEP. 
Because of the model's annual nature, it does not account for 
different seasons of production and shipping between northern and southern 
hemispheres. Thus, the model does not capture the differential impact of 
EEP in markets based on differing sale times. The EEP sales to Brazil 
were conducted during periods when Argentine sales revenue activity into 
this market was low; thus, the impact on Argentine sales may have been 
moderated. The EEP sales to the USSR, however, were conducted 
continuously and may have had a more depressing effect on Argentine sales 
returns from this market. The incorporation of the EEP into the world 
wheat trade model also does not capture the impact of downward price 
pressure in markets not targeted for EEP sales, even though exporters 
displaced in EEP markets may price more competitively for these remaining 
non-EEP markets. 
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The modeling of the EEP also assumes that other nonprice domestic and 
trade policies of other importers and exporters are exogenous in response 
to the EEP. The Canadian Special Grains Program, however, was 
specifically enacted to offset the price-depressing effect of the EEP; 
thus, the modeling approach will overestimate the supply response and 
export reduction by Canada. The EEC wheat acreage set-aside program may 
also be a result of the depressing effect of the EEP on export revenues. 
The modeling assumption that targeted importers receive 
EEP-competitive prices on all commercial imports is an extreme one, which 
results in an overestimate of the impact of the EEP on world trade and an 
underestimate of the impact on other exporters' export levels. The 
modeling approach does not allow for analysis of the impacts of the EEP on 
trade flows between countries. The main impact of the EEP would seem to 
be on trade flows and not on changes in net export and import volumes by 
each country. However, given the EEP objective of additionality, the 
modeling approach does capture the overall net impact of the EEP on world 
trade volumes, market shares, and U.S. net exports. 
In summary, the analysis using the annual world wheat trade model 
indicates that the EEP has expanded U.S. exports and caused a decline in 
Canadian, Australian, and Argentine wheat exports. The export 
additionality of the program is estimated at 8-13 percent over the period 
1986/87 to 1988/89 (Table 8). These results are generally lower than 
those determined in other studies. Hillberg (1988), using a quarterly, 
spatial equilibrium model of world wheat trade, reported EEP additionality 
ranging from 10 percent (October 1985-March 1986) to 17-20 percent 
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(April/June 1987). Bailey (1988) reported export additionality at a 
high of 58 percent for 1986/87 to 14 percent for 1987/88. The 
incorporation of a nonpassive price response by all other exporters in 
response to EEP subsidies is the major determinant that would explain 
the lower estimates of export additionality in this study relative to 
Bailey's estimates. 
The analysis suggests that the ability of the EEP to expand U.S. 
exports (rather than to change the market composition of U.S. exports) 
is limited. The effectiveness of the EEP to increase U.S. wheat exports 
has been moderated by the domestic policies of most major wheat 
importers and exporters, which decrease the domestic price transmission 
elasticities with respect to import prices. U.S. export expansion since 
1985/86 is attributable mainly to production conditions and domestic 
policies of major importing (USSR, China) and exporting (Canada) 
countries. Examination of the EEP with respect to its initial stated 
objectives suggests that the goals of additionality and cost 
effectiveness are not being met. 
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Appendix 
37 
Table A.l. Sumary of esti!mted dcnestic supply an:i denan1 elasticities fran 
&e ..mat trade m:x:lel 
Elasticity with respect to 
::-... 
Thai 
Country/ lm=at Earley SorghLm Com Soybean Rs:peseed Rice 
Region Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Inccm3 
u.s. 
Prcductiona 0.28 
Fox! clensn::! -0.03 0.28 
Feed clensn::! -1.28 0.79 
Stock clensn::! -0.88 
Canada 
Prcduction 0.60 -0.40 
Food clensn::! -0.03 -0.20 
Feed clensn::! -0.60 0.22 0.32 
Australia 
Prcduction 0.18 -0.10 
·~..;;' Exports 0.98 
Argentina 
Prcduction 0.48 -0.27 
Exports 0.17 
EEl: 
Production 0.19 
Feed clensn::! -1.32 1.19 0.97 
Food clensn::! -0.07 0.05 
Other Western El..lrq:e 
Inport clensn::! -0.43 
USSR 
Inport clensn::! -0.79 
Eastern El..lrq:e 
Total use 0.09 
China 
O.Olb Production 
Total use 0.24 
Japan 
Total use -0.12 0.22 
Irrli.a 
Prcduction 0.25 -0.10 
Total clensn::! -0.38 0.76 
HIEAC 
Inport clensn::! -0.17 0.57 
Table A.1. a:ntinued 
Country/ 
Region 
Other Asia 
Producticn 
Total danarxi 
Brazil 
Pro::luctim 
Total danarxi 
M2>d.co 
Production 
Total danarxi 
Other Latin Amarica 
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Elasticity with respect to 
Thai 
WOOat Barley Sorglun Com Soybean ~eed Rice 
Price Price Price Price Price Price Price In:xne 
0.06 -o.04 
-o.l2 0.12 0.66 
0.72 
-o.5o 
0.19 
-o.16 
-o.u 
-o.49 
0.59 
0.10 0.95 
Pro::luctim 0.35 -o.31 
Total danarxi -o .11 
Algeria 
Production 
Total danarxi 
Egypt 
Production 
Total danarxi 
l'brocco 
Production 
Total danarxi 
1\.tnisia 
Production 
Inp:>rts 
Other Mrica 
Production 
Total danarxi 
0.07 
-D.29 
0.15 
0.06 
-o.44 
0.09 
-Q.17 
0.03 
0.15 0.61 
0.55 
0.72 
-D.06 
0.81 
1.63 
0.46 
~ elasticities. 
huasticity with respect to aggregate grain ani wheat price, of which wheat price is a 
cmponent. 
<iugh--Inca!E East Asia. 
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Table A.2. Key price transmission elasticities of wheat prices of other 
regions with respect to U.S. Gulf port wheat price 
Country/Region Elasticity 
Canada 
Wheat export price 1.06 
Australia 
Wheat export price 0.98 
Argentina 
Wheat farm price 0.43 
EEC 
Wheat intervention price 0.02 
Japan 
Wheat resale price 0.28 
India 
Wheat farm price 0.29 
Brazil 
Wheat farm price 0.10 
Algeria 
Wheat farm price 0.57 
Egypt 
Wheat farm price 0.30 
Morocco 
Wheat farm price 0.28 
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Endnotes 
1. The data for these figures come from U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, "Export Markets for U.S. Grain and 
Products," various issues. 
2. Space limitations do not allow reporting the complete details of the 
wheat trade model. Readers interested in the modeling approach, 
structural coefficients, estimated equations, and model validation may 
refer to Devadoss, Helmar, and Meyers (1989). 
3. Generic PIK certificates are presented to export merchants who have 
successfully completed a sale. 
4. Equations 7 and 8 do not result in shifts in the domestic supply and 
demand curves. The effective subsidies create movements along the 
respective supply and demand schedules. 
5. Where information was available on the relative price response of 
competitive exporters to the EEP in specific countries, this information 
was used in place of the full response conjecture. 
6. The degree of overestimation cannot be evaluated because of the 
limitations of incorporating the EEP program details in the world wheat 
model, 
7. Estimated using International Wheat Council statistics. 
8. Roberts and Love (1989) calculate that Australian wheat production was 
reduced by between 0.7 and 1.0 mmt in 1987/88 because of the EEP. The 
Roberts and Love calculation used a point supply elasticity (0.39) 
borrowed from a model of Australian agriculture only, while the current 
study estimates an Australian wheat supply elasticity of 0.18 using a 
world wheat trade model. Our estimated reduction in Australian wheat 
production (0.13 mmt) in 1987/88 is lower than that of Roberts and Love. 
9. The USDA reports a 4.0 mmt increase in China's domestic use, to 105.5 
mmt in 1987/88. These figures are subject to a high degree of error, 
however, because of uncertainty regarding actual PRC wheat production. 
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